



Professor Alexander is justifiably critical of the "pension-fund socialism"
thesis.! The notion that, because pension plans have become the owners of a
major portion of U.S. corporate equity and debt, there is some form of unseen
socialist revolution is nonsensical. If life insurance companies owned these same
assets, there would be no talk of socialism, yet the effect would be similar. The
mere fact that one is the beneficiary of an annuity, life insurance policy, or a
pension plan does not make one the owner of the underlying assets that generate
the wealth necessary to make the payments thereunder.
Socialism is a deeper concept than mere ownership. Even if all the pension
plans and financial intermediaries were eliminated, and all corporate stock were
somehow nationalized and distributed equally to every citizen, the present system
would change little. The separation of ownership from control, in the Berle and
Means sense,2 would remain. Such diffuse ownership would leave corporate
managers even more unfettered than they are today, when at least some financial
intermediaries, especially public pension funds, have become more active in
reviewing management.3 This is a widely recognized contemporary problem, but
it has little to do with pensions.
Classical socialism is the utopian Marxist vision of direct worker ownership
of the means of production. The workers control the factory in which they work
or, certainly, at least the company that employs them. Professor Alexander sees
some type of workplace democracy as a means whereby workers can protect
themselves against plant closings, job relocations, wage reductions, and the like.
One can certainly be skeptical about worker ownership providing enhanced
protection against the general insecurities of the modern global marketplace, but
the main problem with focusing on workplace democracy is that it is fundamen-
tally unrelated to the issue of pension policy.
Professor Alexander views pension plans as a device for achieving workplace
democracy. The plan can simply buy the company, or at least enough of it to
obtain a strong voice in corporate affairs. This "voice" would then be passed to
the plan participants, who would steer the plan fiduciary in some democratic
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fashion. Pension funds certainly could be used in this manner, but nothing
inherent in the nature of a pension fund links it to worker ownership. Consider
the numerous workers employed by the nonprofit institutions in our society, such
as universities and hospitals, as well as the federal, state, and local governments.
How could such workers possibly invest in their employers? The only
connection between pension funds and worker democracy is that workers
interested in buying their employer need money, and pension funds have money.
But one could imagine other ways to gain control over an employer. For
example, if a group of managers can arrange a leveraged buyout of their
company and take it private, in principle the employees could do the same, at
least if potential lenders were convinced that the employees could be profitable
managers.
Professor Alexander's central thesis is that there is a powerful link between
property ownership and responsibility (both individual and civic). Owning
property compels individuals to manage it and to confront the consequences of
their decisions regarding the use of property. It requires the owner to become
responsible. For this reason, the passive form of ownership created by the
pension system, and especially defined benefit plans, diminishes the highly
desirable degree of personal responsibility that classical property ownership
demands.
In my view, there is great danger in basing dramatic changes in retirement
savings policy, changes that could affect the economic security of millions of
workers, on rather abstract philosophical notions. The tragic history of Marxism
is a powerful lesson in the risks presented by utopian visions of the relation
between people and society.' My own brief and admittedly anecdotal, exposure
to humankind suggests that a substantial amount of property is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for responsibility. There are plenty of
responsible people with modest amounts of property and plenty of irresponsible
people with large amounts. The personality traits that lead to civic virtue are
probably developed as a child and adolescent, in most cases long before
significant amounts of property are acquired.
One can accept Professor Alexander's argument that active property
ownership promotes individual self-governance, but at the same time recognize
that for sound reasons of public policy that are democratically determined,
certain rights will be possessed in a more passive fashion. If citizens were
completely dispossessed of active property ownership, as is largely the case in
state socialist regimes, one could certainly predict a stunting of civic virtue and
individual initiative and responsibility. But given a background regime that
4. "The Russian intelligentsia never seriously fought for sausage for the people, instead it fought
for their 'liberation'; and that is being repeated today. Abstract thinking prevailed. The intelligentsia
would not agree to less than salvation, and as a result Russia has nothing-neither salvation nor
sausage." Viktor Erofeev, Neither Salvation Nor Sausage, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, June 14, 1990, at 23,
25.
[Vol. 56: No. 1
Page 141: Winter 19931
generally aspires to free markets and active property ownership, the carving out
of limited passive spheres hardly seems to present serious social risks.
It is difficult to understand how most workers are meaningfully diminished
because their employers provide them with a pension, or even because the
government provides them with social security. The thought that, after years of
hard work, a pension, perhaps even a guaranteed one, awaits, is in many ways
liberating. Now it is true that wages would be higher without these benefits, and
the workers would be free to consume or invest these funds. But a rational
worker would save for retirement, and a rational small investor saving for
retirement would invest in a diversified portfolio. Attempting to construct such
a portfolio through selective investing would lead to below-market returns due
to the increased transaction costs. Our rational worker would then be led to
invest in mutual funds, a highly passive investment.5 If modern portfolio
theory6 makes passive investing the rational choice for retirement saving, how
much harm is truly being done by compelling such passive investing in the form
of pension benefits?
After a discussion of some rather serious countervailing considerations,
Professor Alexander nevertheless concludes his article with a plea for greater
employee "voice" in plan investment decisions. There are two major problems
with his proposal. First, such "voice" in connection with defined benefit plans
(in contrast to defined contribution plans) is inappropriate, largely because it
would give employees some control over property that is not really theirs, a
result more likely to lead to irresponsibility. Second, "voice" has the potential
to compromise another important social goal-retirement income security.
Trning to the first problem, the property rights of a plan participant depend
on the nature of the retirement plan. In the case of a defined contribution plan,
an individual account exists for each participant. The employer makes periodic
contributions to the plan, a portion of which is allocated to each participant. The
account is credited with its share of gains and losses and is charged with its share
of expenses. The participant's benefit is that which is in the account.
In the case of the defined benefit plan, no individual accounts exist. There
is simply the promise of a future benefit, usually determined ("defined") by some
formula set forth in the plan. The actual assets in the trust used to fund the plan
do not determine the benefits. The assets could double in value and not affect
the participants' benefits at all. In such plans, the assets in the trust resemble
assets pledged to secure an obligation. They increase the likelihood that the
promised benefits will be paid. Of course if a plan is overfunded, there may be
5. For a discussion of the implications of the efficient market hypothesis for investment policy, see
Zvi BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN V. MARCUS, INVEsTMENTS 345-49 (1989). Those authors state, "The
small investor is probably better off placing funds in a mutual fund." Id. at 348.
6. Modem portfolio theory suggests that active management can be justified only when an investor
possesses a measurable degree of predictive ability and can efficiently translate that ability into
investment actions. See ROBERT L. HAGIN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY: THE Dow JONES-IRWIN
GUIDE TO MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY, 217-25 (1979). The typical employee will not have these skills.
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a greater probability that the employer will be willing to increase benefits, but
this is still a matter of employer choice.
If the assets are invested poorly, or the rate of return is less than expected,
the employer will have to make up the shortfall by contributing more to the
trust. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")7
imposes liability on the employer, and even certain related employers, for any
shortfall.8 If the assets perform exceptionally well and achieve a rate of return
greater than expected, the employer benefits by being able to reduce future
contributions. The employer may even be able to terminate the plan and
recover any surplus, although Congress has severely discouraged this practice by
imposing a fifty percent excise tax on such reversions.9 As Fischel and Langbein
have pointed out, the employer's interest in the plan is such that it is sensible to
think of the employer also as a beneficiary of the plan.1°
If, due to insolvency or bankruptcy, the employer is unable to make up a
shortfall in plan assets, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC")
will cover the promised benefits, up to a statutory maximum." Thus, the
PBGC is an insurer of plan benefits and is vitally interested in proper trust
investment so that its risk of having to pay on its guarantee is as low as possible.
Why should employees have a major voice in how the defined benefit plan's
funds are invested? If below-market returns are received because investments
are targeted to certain firms or communities or are simply mismanaged due to
mistaken investment choices, it is the employer in the first instance, and then the
PBGC, who must pay, not the workers. The PBGC currently insures the
payment of defined benefits up to $2,352 per month,12 far beyond the average
pension."
Professor Alexander argues that employees do bear a significant risk because
underfunding is a major problem. Though underfunding is a major problem, it
is limited to a small group of firms, concentrated mainly in a few industries. The
vast majority of plans are adequately funded.14 The list of industries with
significant concentrations of underfunded plans is instructive; primary metals
(steel, for example) and transportation equipment (automobiles, for example)
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. II 1990). The Act
is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1362.
9. I.R.C. § 4980 (1988). If the employer establishes an appropriate replacement plan or provides
a certain level of increased benefits to the participants, the excise tax drops to 20%. Id.
10. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit
Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1117-19 (1988).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. 111990).
12. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,985 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2621, Appendix A).
13. In 1987 the average annual retiree benefit was $5,200. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, PENSION
AND WELFARE BENEFITs ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN PENSIONS 13 (1989).
14. "From 1974 to 1985 the percentage of plans achieving fully funded status more than doubled
from 35 to 73% based on termination liabilities calculated from the plan's own actuarial assumptions.
Moreover, in 1985 the assets held by plans were 116% of total liabilities on a termination basis." Id. at
125.
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account for a major share of the underfunding."5 Consider how much worse the
underfunding (and the corresponding government liability) would have been if
these plans had heavily invested in their own sponsors. In any event, what
underfunding does exist is, as noted above, primarily a problem for the PBGC.
The average pensioner will not lose anything. To provide employees with
control over plan investments in a defined benefit plan is to allow them to play
with other people's money.
An international comparison is instructive. In Germany, the most common
type of pension is an unfunded defined benefit plan. 6 The liability to the
participants is carried on the employer's books, but no assets are set aside in
trust or earmarked in any way. The German equivalent of the PBGC insures the
promise up to a certain level. 7 What the participants own is a contractual right
to future payments. There is no fund over which it can be sensibly said that the
participants deserve some control. In reality, our system is not much different,
except that the managers of the PBGC can sleep better at night knowing that
there are earmarked funds in a trust, thereby reducing the probability of loss to
the PBGC.
Although Professor Alexander seems hostile to defined benefit plans because
of the inevitably passive nature of the employees' property rights, such plans
have important and unique benefits regarding retirement security. First, because
employees are compelled to participate as a group, the annuity is fairly priced.
The cost depends on the average life expectancy of the group. If a participant
sought an equivalent annuity from a private insurer, it would be more expensive.
The reason is self-selection. People who are ill, or for one reason or another
(family history of disease or early death) expect to die earlier than the average
person, tend to view annuities as a bad investment. Thus, purchasers of private
annuities tend, on average, to live longer than the general population. Insurers
must price their products accordingly.
A second advantage of defined benefit plans is risk spreading. A defined
benefit plan can afford to invest in a riskier portfolio because its investment
horizon is not one lifetime but indefinite. For example, suppose one is a few
years away from retirement. Would it be prudent to buy a thirty year bond or
a risky start-up company? One tends, sensibly, to invest more conservatively to
avoid sharp wealth changes as one approaches retirement. But the defined
benefit plan need never become conservative. Because of its longer time
15. Id. at 150, tbl. 8.6. In 1985, "83 percent of the total amount underfunded was concentrated in
only 3 of the 11 major industries." Id. at 142. Most of the PBGC's deficit is attributable to a handful
of large claims. The 12 largest claims against the PBGC account for 76% of the claims through 1986.
Almost 80% of these claims are attributable to the decline of the steel industry. See RICHARD A.
IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 42-43 (tbl. 3-2) (1989).
16. See Bruce A. Wolk, Taxation of Unfunded Deferred Compensation: A Comparison of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the U.S. Systems, 6 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW., Winter 1988, at 1, 2.
17. All such plans must meet certain minimum requirements of German labor law. The relevant
statute is the Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung [BetrAVG] of December 19,
1974, 1974 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI I] 3610, as amended.
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horizon, the defined benefit plan can invest in a riskier, and thereby more
diverse portfolio, which, according to modem portfolio theory, will produce a
higher average rate of return.
If, as I have argued, defined benefit plans are inherently and appropriately
passive with respect to the participants, representing someone else's property and
not the participants', the same cannot be said of defined contribution plans. As
to such plans, one can sensibly look through the account to the underlying
investments and ask what role the participant should play in selecting them. But
here we must face the second problem with Professor Alexander's proposal, the
conflict between retirement security and employee "voice."
Under the present system, the employer has a choice. It can hand the
management of investments over to specialists, or it can give the participants
control over their accounts. The specialist will have only one goal: maximizing
return at a reasonable level of risk. Modem portfolio theory leads such
specialists to diversify the portfolio. ERISA also requires diversification."8
With decisionmaking in the hands of an investment manager, a defined
contribution plan is as passive as a defined benefit plan, from the participant's
perspective.
Recognizing that employees often desire to manage their accounts, many
firms adopt an intermediate approach. Employees are given a selection of
various investments-money market funds, bonds, and equities. If participants
exercise "control" over the assets in their accounts, ERISA provides that they
are not deemed to be fiduciaries by reason of such control, and that no fiduciary
shall be liable for any loss that results from such control. 9 Detailed Depart-
ment of Labor regulations specify when a participant is deemed to have control
over his or her account.2 ° In particular, the participant must be offered a broad
range of investment alternatives, including at least one relatively "safe"
investment such as insured interest-bearing deposits in a bank or similar financial
institution.
Even when employees are given a range of alternatives, encompassing various
risks and rates of return, employees have tended to be risk-averse. Investment
is routinely skewed to insured deposits or money market investments and away
from equity. This lack of diversification into riskier investments inevitably
produces a lower rate of return in the long run.
Although the administrative costs are greater, some firms permit even
broader employee control. For example, employees could be given the power
to invest in individual stocks, including stock of the employer. Such plans
highlight the tension between active ownership and retirement security. The
power to control property is the power to lose it. The retirement policy issue is
18. "[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan.., by diversifying the investments
of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so." ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
20. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906 (1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
[Vol. 56: No. 1
Page 141: Winter 1993]
whether we should permit an employee to manage incompetently his or her
retirement savings, or even to gamble intentionally with it in the hope of
achieving above-market rates of return.
Professor Alexander concedes that there is a trade-off between employee
"voice" and risk, but on balance attaches a greater weight to "voice." I reach the
opposite conclusion. There is no doubt that greater control over one's life is a
worthy goal, but society often narrows the range of individual choice. It is part
of the compromise we are forced to make when we participate in human society.
There are, of course, many who object to all paternalistic policies of government.
They argue that each individual has a right to drive a motorcycle without a
helmet and each individual has the right to invest his or her retirement savings
in the Silicon Valley start-up company of his or her choice. For some it is a
matter of natural law, the inalienable right to be wrong as a moral end in and of
itself. For others, and I think Professor Alexander is among them, it is a matter
of the social gains to be achieved by increased individual responsibility, namely,
concern for the consequences of one's use of property and the development of
civic virtue. As to the former group, there can be no answer. For them,
paternalism is immoral. As to the latter group, the debate concerns whether the
social gains associated with increased "voice" are outweighed by the social risks
of retirement insecurity. I find such gains rather abstract and philosophical, and
somewhat speculative, whereas the risks are all too real.
Our elected representatives have consciously chosen a paternalistic retirement
system. The basis of this decision is the belief that many individuals often will
not act in their own best interests in deciding how and when to save for
retirement, a belief supported by psychological evidence.21 We force each other
to save for retirement through the mandatory Social Security system, and
encourage additional saving through employer pensions, which, although not
mandatory, are heavily subsidized by generous tax incentives. The tax
expenditure attributable to these incentives is estimated to be $56.5 billion per
year.22 Allowing participants to put their retirement savings at risk is inconsis-
tent with the purpose of this subsidy.
Even if one were convinced to give greater weight to the need for employee
"voice," Professor Alexander's linking of such "voice" to workplace democracy
seems misplaced. Given greater freedom to control their retirement funds,
would employees necessarily invest in their employer? In Employee Stock
Option Plans ("ESOPs"), employees are compelled to invest their retirement
funds primarily in the stock of their employer. They have a right to diversify
only when they reach age fifty-five and complete ten years of participation.'
21. See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic
Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275, 1318 (1991).
22. Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1993-1997, Joint Committee on Taxation
Staff Description (JCS-8-92) 17, tbl. 1.
23. I.R.C. § 401(a)(28) (1992).
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If responsibility is the goal and passivity the enemy, why not allow workers to
diversify at any age?
Compelling employees to invest all or a portion of their retirement savings
in their employers reduces their responsibility, since certainly a key feature of
classical ownership is the right to change one's investment, that is, to exchange
one type of property for another. Although Professor Alexander recognizes that
the modern ESOP is really more of a corporate finance device and is critical of
ESOPs for their lack of true employee democracy,24 he seems to accept a
system that would compel employees to invest in their employers.
In my view, ESOPs have no place in the tax-favored retirement system.
They provide precious little security to employees. Imagine how much worse the
steelworkers would be if their retirement savings were in a steel company
ESOP.2 Only after there is some minimum level of retirement security can one
link retirement investing to such assets. Even then, one has to wonder why
ESOPs should receive such favorable tax treatment.
There are many people and interest groups who see the $2.2 trillion in
corporate pension funds and the $800 billion in public funds as a solution to a
wide variety of problems. They have ambitious plans for targeted investing,
whether in the workplace, the community, the decaying cities, or elsewhere.26
There is great danger in compromising the current goal of maximum retirement
security. The result could be hopeless politicization and conflict, not to mention
reduced retirement saving. As Professor Stein has pointed out in his symposium
article,27 social investing, if it actually makes a difference, is never costless.
24. The democratic defects noted by Professor Alexander could be cured in large part by allowing
the pass-through voting of the unallocated shares. In my view, the statute permits this, but the
Department of Labor obviously disagrees. See Opinion Letter on Tender Offers, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
No. 9, at 351, 390 (Feb. 23, 1989).
25. Although not an ESOP, Carter Hawley Hale Stores 401(k) plan invested solely in employer
stock, which led to a severe erosion of the employees' retirement savings when Carter Hawley entered
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. See Francine Schwadel, Carter Hawley 401(k)'s Yields Fall Short,
WALL ST. J., June 18, 1992, at C1.
26. For a discussion and critique of some of these plans, see Stephen E. Clark, Tapping Pension
Power to Rebuild America Inc., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1992, at 45.
27. Norman Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (Winter 1993).
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